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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Although the act did not make the employer an insurer, it was
"designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the
legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed. . . ." 34 The con-
clusion reached in the principal case effectuates that purpose. It
is evident that Congress did not intend to include troublesome
problems of causation that could bring about harsh results in the
application of the act.3 5 The Court' decision will tend to bring
future litigation closer in line with the original objectives of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.
M
LABOR LAw - CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF NLRB AND
ARBITRATOR WHEN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE BREACHES COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. - Petitioner, a labor union,
sought to compel Westinghouse Electric Corporation to arbitrate
a representation dispute which included a grievance constituting
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act.' The col-
lective bargaining agreement required Westinghouse to recognize
the union as the representative of "production and maintenance"
employees. The grievance stated that certain workers supposedly
doing "experimental" work were actually doing "production" work
and hence, that the union should be recognized as the bargaining
agent for these workers. The refusal of Westinghouse to do so
constituted both a breach of contract and an unfair labor practice
since petitioner union had been certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the representative of "production and main-
tenance" workers. Since the grievance involved an unfair labor
practice, a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
the question arose whether the controversy could be sent to arbitra-
tion, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the agreement, by a
state court. The Appellate Division held that the dispute should
be heard by the NLRB because of its expertise in the field of
union representation, but emphasized that "a breach of contract
does not become ipso facto incapable of arbitration because it also
34Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68, rehearing denied, 336 U.S.
940 (1949).
35 See Pound, Foreword to Elkind, Which Court?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 356,
358-60 (1956).
1Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §8(a)(5), 61
Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
159(a). . . ." Ibid.
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happens to be an unfair labor practice." Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 7, 221 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't
1961).
The question of pre-emption by the NLRB has plagued our
courts since Congress passed the Labor Management Relations
Act 3 [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The purpose of this
legislation was the promotion of a national policy in furtherance
of peaceful labor relations.4  Under the Act, the NLRB is
empowered to prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor
practices. 5 The question whether the NLRB has exclusive juris-
diction of unfair labor practices which are not in violation of
bargaining contracts has been settled by the United States Supreme
Court.6  The unequivocal pronouncement by that Court affirming
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB in such cases has been
accordingly followed by the courts in New York.7
No such uniformity of opinion can be found in either the
New York courts or the federal courts regarding the instant
question, i. e., who has jurisdiction if the unfair labor practice
is also a breach of contract? The majority of New York courts
have held that such an unfair labor practice could not be arbitrable
because the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. The majority of
these decisions have been promulgated by the New York Supreme
2 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 7, 12, 221 N.Y.S.2d
303, 308 (1st Dep't 1961).
361 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat.525, 541, 542, 544, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159-60, 164 (Supp. 1, 1959).
461 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection." Ibid.
5 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). "The Board is
empowered . .. to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce." Ibid.
6San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
"When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245.
In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), the Court
held that even when the NLRB declines to assume jurisdiction of an unfair
labor practice, it may not proceed to a state court.
7E. g., Spartan Coat, Apron, Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Simon, 6
N.Y.2d 829, 159 N.E.2d 700, 188 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1959) (memorandum
decision).
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Court.8 The Appellate Division had not directly concerned itself
with the question of pre-emption until the present case although
there have been some recent dicta to the effect that the filing of an
unfair labor practice would not preclude the enforcement of a
collective bargaining contract in a New York state court.9
This same lack of uniformity is evident in the federal courts
although there appears to be a modern trend which does not
recognize the doctrine of pre-emption. The federal courts had
recognized the NLRB as having exclusive jurisdiction regardless
of the contract breach 10 until the significant decision of Lodge
No. 12 v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc. in 1958.11 This opinion
held that, though the same act be both an unfair labor practice
and an arbitrable contract violation, "the parties should not be
forced to abandon their contract right. .... ,, 12 The court stressed
that contract provisions are obviously different from other matters
committed exclusively to the board,' 3 viz., unfair labor practices
which do not violate contract provisions. The former embody
strictly private rights enforceable by the courts; while the latter,
though they also are private rights, are in fact quasi-public in
that they are used to effectuate the declared public policy of
the Act. 14 The court declared that the unfair labor practices
should come under the jurisdiction of the NLRB since such con-
s E.g., In the Matter of New York Mailers' Union Number Six, 222
N.Y.S.7d 1000, 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Bloomer Bros. Co. v. Smith, 20 Misc.
2d 345, 347, 189 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1959); General Warehouse-
men's Union v. Glidden Co., 10 Misc. 2d 700, 706, 172 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683
(Sup. Ct. 1958); A. E. Nettleton Co. v. United Shoeworkers Union, 138
N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Contra, District 65, Distributive, Proc-
essing & Office Workers Union v. Gerda Footwear Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
9 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 6 App. Div. 2d 582, 584, 180
N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (1st Dep't 1958) (per curiam), aff'd on other grounds,
6 N.Y.2d 934, 161 N.E.2d 216, 190 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1959); Klein v. Styl-Rite
Optics, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 811, 812, 188 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1st Dep't 1959)
(memorandum decision) (3-2 decision).
1oUnited Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); NLRB v. International Union,
UAW, 194 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1952).
"257 F.2d 467, 471-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
12 Id. at 474.
13 Id. at 472.
14 "However, in this case, we must go one step further because sub-
stantially the same conduct here involved would constitute a violation of the
contract and an unfair labor practice. The distinguishing point is that, while
an act may be both an arbitrable contract violation and an unfair labor
practice, a 'breach of contract is not an unfair labor practice'; the former
is enforced by the courts, the latter by the Board; the former gives to
private parties a remedy, the latter uses a private right to effectuate the
declared policies of the Act; the former gives a certainty of decision, the
latter leaves decision discretionary." Id. at 473.
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duct is contrary to the avowed national policy of the Act. But
the court also argued that since the same act was a contract
violation, and it was the manifest intent of the parties that such
conduct should be subject to arbitration, the arbitrator also would
have jurisdiction. Such reasoning has led to a federal trend
of concurrent jurisdiction over such acts.'"
The obvious problem attached to this doctrine is the possibility
of diverse results, e.g., it is conceivable that an arbitrator may
uphold the discharge of an employee when upon the same facts
the NLRB would conclude that the discharge is an unfair labor
practice.16 The Cameron case offers no solution to this difficulty
but suggests that "even though the Board is not bound by an
arbitration award, it may find that compliance with the award is
not violative of the Act . . ." 17 or it may even decline jurisdiction
because the arbitrable solution was adequate.:8
In the principal case, the majority expressly declared that a
breach of contract does not become ipso facto incapable of arbitra-
tion because it also happens to be an unfair labor practice. It
indicated, however, that if a particular dispute involved a sub-
stantial question in an area in which the expertise of the NLRB
has found expression, that factor would be determinative of the
appropriate forum. The majority determined that this dispute in-
volved an element of representation and that was unquestionably
a field in which the NLRB has particular skill.'9
The dissenting opinion, after echoing the majority's rejection
of pre-emption, objected to its use of the expertise criterion on
the ground that such a standard would lead to a facts-of-each-case
approach to the problem. It declared that the issue of union
'
5 United Steelworkers Union v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352,
358 (10th Cir. 1959); International Union of Operating Engineers v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 262 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (case reversed and
remanded on strength of Cameron jurisdictional holding). Contra, Inter-
national Chem. Workers v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L.
REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH Lab. Cas.) It 17432 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1962); Local
1357, Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 42 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff16945 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
16 107 U. PA. L. REv. 876, 880 (1959).
1 Lodge No. 12 v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467, 473 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
18 McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930, 935 (1954); Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
'9 See Matter of American Buslines, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 877, 884-87(D. Neb. 1957).
Labor Management Relations Act § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1958), provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
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representation is arbitrable and concurrent with the full functioning
of the NLRB. The problem of divergent results is "solved" by
invoking the Cameron hope that the NLRB will either accept the
arbitrator's decision or decline jurisdiction because of the availability
of arbitration.
Since the doctrine of pre-emption has been expressly rejected
by the Appellate Division, the conflict-of-remedies possibility is
the major obstacle to the workability of concurrent jurisdiction.2 0
The attitude of the NLRB has been encouraging. It has ex-
pressed a desire to recognize the arbitrator's award 21 as well as
expressing its approval of settlement by arbitration in general. 22
There have been cases where the NLRB has refused to assume
jurisdiction because arbitration was available. 23  The apparent
reason for such cooperation from the NLRB is the fact that
the Board is presently overburdened with charges dealing with
unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce.2 4 In one case,
the NLRB accepted an arbitrator's award in an unfair labor
practice case because three minimal requirements were met: 1)
the arbitration proceedings were "fair and regular," 2) all parties
had agreed to be bound and 3) the arbitration decision was not
"clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." 25 The
attitude of the NLRB clearly indicates that if the arbitrator's
award is reasonable, the Board will most likely accept the award
or even decline to assume jurisdiction over the controversy. In
effect, such procedure allays the fears of those who foresee con-
flicting remedies. If there is a conflict, it seems clear that the
jurisdiction of the NLRB would then be pre-emptive, for the
purposes of the Act could only be effectuated if the NLRB
prevented a contrary remedy from being effective.
The instant decision indicates that New York has adopted
the emerging federal viewpoint of concurrent jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices which also breach contracts.20 The potential
20107 U. PA. L. Rzv. 876, 880 (1959).
21Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). "[W]e believe that
the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes will best be served by our recognition of the arbitrators' award."
Id. at 1082.
22Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Juris-
dictional Problems, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 52, 63-65 (1957) ; Beatty, Arbitration
of Unfair Labor Practice Disputes, 14 ARB. J. 180, 188 (1959).
23 Cases cited note 18 supra.
24Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 725, 729 (1956). "Moreover, the courts'
refusal to exercise jurisdiction adds to the work load of the NLRB
which is already unable effectively to exercise jurisdiction over all unfair
labor practices that affect interstate commerce."
25 Spielberg Mfg. Co., supra note 21, at 1082.
20 At the time the principal decision was rendered, it was unclear whether
a state court was compelled to follow federal labor law. Subsequently,
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danger of conflicting remedies seems greatly diminished by the
present attitude of the NLRB. Perhaps the only disturbing
element in this opinion is the Court's attempt to establish a standard
to determine when a case will be directed to the NLRB. The
court's criterion demands that a dispute be channeled to the NLRB
if it involves a substantial question in an area in which the NLRB
has expressed its peculiar expertise. Such an ad hoc standard
may give rise to two difficulties. Firstly, determining whether the
NLRB has displayed its expertise in a given area may result in
close questions for which the courts have no rigid guide. Secondly,
since the NLRB has demonstrated its expertise in those areas in
which it would have exclusive jurisdiction were it not for a con-
tract breach, it may be that such a criterion will create a kind of
pre-emption by judicial fiat. If the latter be true, the doctrine
of concurrent jurisdiction propounded by the court may be more
academic than real.
LABOR LAw - CONTRACT-BAR RULE - AmBIGUOUS UNION-
SECURITY CLAUSE A BAR TO REPRESENTATION ELECTION. - Pe-
titioner, United Mine Workers of America, brought a representation
proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board during the
insulated period of a current collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the intervenor, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, and the employer. The petitioning union alleged that
the contract was not a bar to an election by the employees who
were seeking another representative because the union-security
provision did not on its face conform to the requirements of Section
8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board, over-
ruling major portions of its previously devised Keystone rule, held
that since the union-security clause was not clearly unlawful it
would constitute a bar to a representation election. Paragon
Prods. Corp., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.)
ff10657 (Nov. 28, 1961).
however, on March 3, 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 82 Sup. Ct. 571, 576-77 (1962), un-
equivocally declared that federal labor law must be applied in labor cases
litigated in state courts. Since the federal viewpoint on concurrent juris-
diction is still unsettled (see text accompanying note 15 supra), this ruling
on the supremacy of federal labor law does not necessarily mean that the
outcome of the principal decision would have been changed.
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